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Protecting Our Mentally Ill: A Critique of
the Role of Indiana State Courts in
Protecting Involuntarily Committed Mental
Patients' Right to Refuse Medication
MICHAEL LEONARD GOFF, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
It is a well-settled principle that an involuntarily committed mental patient has a
right to refuse unwanted medical treatment and a liberty interest in remaining free
from bodily intrusions accompanying such treatment.1 While the Supreme Court has
found such an interest under the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, it has
emphasized that the "substantive and procedural issues [in a case where an
involuntarily committed mental patient refuses treatment] are intertwined with state
... law."2 As such, the role of state courts in defining the rights of involuntarily
committed mental patients to refuse medication is crucial to the protection of a
patient's right to refuse unwanted treatment.
In Youngberg v. Romeo,3 the Supreme Court embraced a federal constitutional
standard that provides only narrow protection of an involuntarily committed mental
patient's right to refuse medication, since it places the decision to medicate solely
within the health care provider's professional judgment.4 In other related contexts,
however, the Supreme Court subsequently seemed to recognize a slightly broader
right to refuse medication than the professional-judgment standard.5
While, at best, the Supreme Court refusal-of-treatment cases provide inconsistent
standards of review with a relatively narrow standard for protecting the rights of
involuntarily committed mental patients, many state courts have recognized a much
broader right to refuse medication under their state constitutions.6 For example, in
Rivers v. Katz,' the New York Court of Appeals articulated a standard of strict
scrutiny that adequately balances the liberty interest of the involuntarily committed
* J.D. Candidate, 2001, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.S.,
Sociology, 1997, Virginia Commonwealth University. Special thanks to my wife, Vickey, and
to my family, Mike, Denise, and Daniel, for their love and encouragement.
1. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307,316 (1982); Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291,299
(1982); see also James A. King, Comment, An Involuntary Mental Patient's Right to Refuse
Treatment with Antipsychotic Drugs: A Reassessment, 48 01O0 ST. L.J. 1135, 1135-38 (1987).
2. Mills, 457 U.S. at 299; Steven Mintz, TheNightmare ofForcibleMedication: The New
York Court ofAppeals Protects the Rights ofthe Mentally 111 Underthe State Constitution, 53
BROOK. L. REv. 885, 888-90 (1987) (discussing Mills).
3. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
4. Id. at 321-22.
5. See William M. Brooks, Reevaluating Substantive Due Process as a Source of
Protection for Psychiatric Patients to Refuse Drugs, 31 IND. L. REV. 937, 940 (1998)
(discussing the Supreme Court's consideration of cases concerning the right to refuse
medication in two other contexts: medicating a prisoner and medicating a criminal defendant
to induce competency).
6. Id. at 940-41.
7. 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986).
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mental patient with the state interest in medicating the patient.' This standard first
requires the state to prove that a patient is incompetent to make their own treatment
decisions,9 an inquiry conducted completely independently of the facts surrounding
the patient's initial commitment in the mental facility.10 After finding that mental
illness does not, in and of itself, reduce a person's fundamental right to refuse
unwanted intrusion into their body, the court stated that this right can be overridden
only by a compelling state interest, such as when the patient poses imminent danger
to herself or others." The Rivers standard is akin to the strict scrutiny standard
applied in substantive due process jurisprudence when an individual's fundamental
rights are infringed upon. This strict scrutiny standard adequately protects a
patient's right to refuse treatment in nonemergency situations while recognizing a
state's overriding compelling interest to medicate in emergencies.
Although the Supreme Court of Indiana has not adopted the professional-judgment
standard, the Indiana standard strongly resembles the narrow protection that the
professional-judgment standard affords 3 and does not adequately protect the rights
of involuntarily committed mental patients. At the time of judicial review, such
patients have not been adjudged incompetent to make treatment decisions. Yet, the
Indiana standard assumes that the involuntarily committed status of select mental
patients equates to incompetency and, therefore, allows the state to assert its parens
patriae power without first determining whether the individual is capable of making
medical decisions in their own best interest. Indiana courts should recognize that a
patient's fundamental rights are not contingent upon their commission status and
should be afforded full protection by applying strict judicial scrutiny to unwanted
treatment decisions. Because of the inconsistency of the federaljudiciary in this area,
it is extremely important that the state courts of Indiana formulate a standard of
judicial review that adequately protects the fundamental rights of involuntarily
committed mental patients in Indiana.
Ironically, in addition to providing insufficient protection for an involuntarily
committed mental patient's fundamental rights, the standard of judicial review used
in Indiana is unworkable because it fails to make allowances for the state to medicate
patients forcibly when a legitimate emergency exists. The Supreme Court of Indiana
has expressed misplaced concern for a patient's liberty interest if a standard
exempting emergency situations from review were adopted. The compelling interest
of the state to medicate a patient in an emergency situation should override a patient's
right to refuse medication, so long as a least-restrictive-means analysis is used.
This Note offers the Rivers strict scrutiny standard as a model of a more workable
standard for the State of Indiana. Part I of this Note considers the extent of the
8. Id. at 342-43.
9. See id. at 342.
10. Roederick C. White, Sr., What Right to Privacy? The Risk to the Voluntary Mental
Health Patient as a Result ofLouisiana 's Current Forcible Medication Statute, 24 S.U. L.REv.
1,8(1996).
11. Rivers, 495 N.E.2d at 343.
12. See White, supra note 10, at 11-12.
13. In re Mental Commitment of M.P., 510 N.E.2d 645,647 (Ind. 1987) ("The standard
proposed by the State of professional judgment points in the right direction and can lead to a
form which will provide an appropriate balance of interests.").
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potential infringement upon an individual's fundamental due process rights because
of the risks inherent in and the nature of antipsychotic medications. Part II considers
the role of courts in cases of refusal of treatment in the State of Indiana and,
specifically, the professional-judgment standard as articulated by the Supreme Court
of Indiana. It first addresses the problems of using the professional-judgment
standard to establish a balance between the liberty interest of the patient and the
treatment interests of the state. Part II then moves to a discussion of the problems
associated with Indiana's lack of a competency hearing in refusal-of-treatment cases.
Finally, the standard adopted by the Supreme Court of Indiana in such cases is
criticized as unworkable for its failure to recognize the only interest of the state that
should be found overriding without a determination of incompetency: preventing
danger to the patient or others. Part ImI of this Note highlights the advantages of the
approach formulated in Rivers, 4 among other state court decisions, and suggests that
Indiana use a similar approach to protect the rights of its mental patients adequately.
I. THE NATURE AND DANGERS OF ANTIPSYCHOTIC MEDICATION
Antipsychotic drugs'5 are by their very nature designed to affect thought processes
of mental patients.'6 The aim of these medications is to reverse symptoms of
psychoses." For a patient suffering from psychosis, these drugs may have the dual
effect of alleviating delusions and elevating a patient's mood. At the same time these
drugs reduce any violent behavior," allowing the mental institution to function more
orderly and easing the treatment of patients. 9
Antipsychotic drugs do have many therapeutic benefits; however, these benefits are
undermined by very serious, potentially fatal, side effects.20 A patient taking
antipsychotic medication is at risk of developing numerous side effects,2' the most
devastating of which is the risk ofcontractingtardive dyskinesia.u Tardive dyskinesia
is a potentially permanent neurological disorder that has symptoms including
14. Rivers, 495 N.E.2d at 342-44.
15. The term "antipsychotic drugs" usually refers to medications such as Thorazine,
Mellaril, Prolixin, and Haldol, which are used in treating psychoses. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S.
291,293 n.l (1982).
16. Id.
17. Psychosis is "a mental disorder characterized by loss of contact with reality." William
M. Brooks, A Comparison ofa Mentallyf1lindividual'sRight to Refuse Medication Under the
United States and the New York State Constitutions, 8 TOURO L. REV. 1, 6 (1991) (citing
WEBSTER'S MEDICAL DESK DICTIONARY 588 (1986)).
18. Lisa Litwiller, Note, Defining Constitutional Parameters: The Forced Drugging of
Civilly CommittedMentalPatients, I S. CAL INTERDISCiPLINARY L.L 57,60 (1992) (discussing
the beneficial aspects of antipsychotic drugs on patients suffering from schizophrenia).
19. Mills, 457 U.S. at 293 n.1.
20. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210,229 (1990).
21. These side effects, which are for the most part reversible upon termination of
medication, include oversedation of the patient, akathesia (which is an irresistible impulse to
move), pseudo-Parkinsonism, blurred vision, nausea, drymouth, and lowblood pressure. Riese
v. St. Mary's Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 243 Cal. Rptr. 241,245 (Ct. App. 1987).
22. Id. at 245-46; Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 339 n.1 (N.Y. 1986); Litwiller, supra
note 18, at 61.
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involuntary tongue and facial movements, and it may interfere with all motor
activity.' This disorder may result from cumulative treatment over a long period of
time or may occasionally occur after only brief treatment with antipsychotic
medications.24 Evidence suggests that approximately ten to twenty-five percent of
patients treated with antipsychotic drugs exhibit symptoms of tardive dyskinesia
Tardive dyskinesia can also be fatal by causing neuroleptic malignant syndrome,26 a
disorder that is fatal twenty-five percent of the time.27
Despite the extreme hazards of these drugs, they are still prescribed by clinicians
who believe that the beneficial effects outweigh the dangers of the possible side
effects.2" In many, if not most cases, prescribing clinicians would be correct in their
assessment that antipsychotic drugs would alleviate a patient's psychoses.29 These
physicians may argue that they are best situated to make such a determination within
the institution.
An involuntarily committed mental patient who disagrees. with a physician's
decision to use these potentially debilitating drugs, however, has little recourse
available other than turning to the legal system.3" The expert medical opinions offered
under the Supreme Court's professional-judgment standard3 may be useful in
deciding whether antipsychotic medication for an individual patient may be helpful.
The courts, however, should have an important role in defining the substantive rights
of the patient to be free from such potentially harmful medication.32
Because of the important role of the state courts in protecting a patient's decisions
to be free fromthe previously mentioned serious potential side effects, Indiana should
adopt a standard of review that will provide broader protection for the patient's right
to refuse such treatment in nonemergency situations. The next Part of this Note
considers the existing deficiencies of courts' role in refusal-of-treatment cases in
Indiana.
23. Riese, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 245-46; In re Mental Commitment of M.P., 510 N.E.2d 645,
646-47 (Ind. 1987) (finding that at the heart of an involuntary treatment case was the "virtually
undisputed allegation that a person medicated with anti-psychotic drugs has a fifty percent risk
of contracting tardive dyskinesia"); Brooks, supra note 5, at 948-50 (discussing diagnosis and
treatment of tardive dyskinesia).
24. Riese, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 246.
25. Harper, 494 U.S. at 230.
26. For a discussion of the dangers, symptoms, and prevalence of neuroleptic malignant
syndrome, see David E. Sternberg, Neuroleptic Malignant Syndrome: The Pendulum Swings,
143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1273 (1986). See generally Raymond A. Smego, Jr. & David T.
Durack, The Neuroleptic Malignant Syndrome, 142 ARCIUVES INTERNAL MED. 1183 (1982).
27. Litwiller, supra note 18, at 62.
28. Id. (citing Paul S. Appelbaum& Thomas G. Gutheil, "Rotting with Their Rights On":
Constitutional Theory and Clinical Reality in Drug Refusal by Psychiatric Patients, 7 BULL
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 306, 308 (1979)).
29. See Litwiller, supra note 18, at 60, 62.
30. Id. at 62.
31. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321-23 & nn.29-31 (1982) (articulating a
professional-judgment test for refusal-of-treatment cases).
32. Sheldon Gelman, The Biological Alteration Cases, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1203,
1246 (1995).
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II. DEFICIENCIES IN THE STANDARD OF REVIEW USED BY INDIANA COURTS
IN REFUSAL-OF-TREATMENT CASES
Indiana statutorily provides for judicial review in situations where treatment has
been refused.33 The Supreme Court of Indiana has adopted an adaptation of the
professional-judgment standard when dealing with right-to-refuse cases.34 The court
recognized, however, that the treating psychiatrist may have conflicting interests.35
The court attempted to protect the involuntarily committed mental patient's liberty
interest by requiring a determination of which of the treating psychiatrist's interests
is the "honest" foundation for the treatment decision, instead of merely requiring that
the judgment be a professionally accepted one." Under this standard, at the statutorily
provided judicial hearing the state can override a patient's right to refuse treatment
if it is demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that
1) a current and individual medical assessment ofthe patient's condition has been
made; 2) that it resulted in the honest belief of the psychiatrist that the
medications will be of substantial benefit in treating the condition suffered, and
not just in controlling the behavior of the individual; 3) and that the probable
benefits from the proposed treatment outweigh the risk of harm to, and personal
concerns of, the patient.
37
This is the standard articulated by the Supreme Court of Indiana in an attempt to
establish "a balance between the patient's liberty interest, the State'sparenspatriae
power to act in the patient's best interest, and the State's duty to provide treatment.' 38
However, this standard, which leans very heavily towards relying solely on the
professional judgment of the treating doctors, does not establish this desired balance.
33. See IND. CODE § 16-14-1.6-7 (repealed 1992) (stating that involuntary patients wishing
to refuse treatment are entitled to petition the court for consideration of the treatment). While
the Supreme Court of Indiana relied primarily on this statute to find the liberty interest of the
patient in 1987, see In re Mental Commitment of M.P., 510 N.E.2d 645 (Ind. 1987), in 1992
this statute was repealed, and two new statutes now govern a mental patient's right to refuse
medication. Section 12-27-5-1 ofthe Indiana Code deals with a voluntary mental patient's right
to refuse, stating that they may refuse medication so long as they are not adjudicated mentally
incompetent. IND. CODE § 12-27-5-1 (1998). Section 12-27-5-2 of the Indiana Code follows
in the footsteps of the former statute and relies on the Supreme Court of Indiana's decision in
In re Mental Commitment of MP., by allowing the patient wishing to refuse medication to
petition the court for consideration. Id. § 12-27-5-2. This does not provide the patient with as
much of a liberty interest as would'the requirement of an adjudication of incompetency.
34. In re Mental Commitment of M.P., 510 N.E.2d. at 647.
35. After recognizing that the professional-judgment standard points in the right direction,
the Supreme Court of Indiana found that "[s]tanding alone, however, it is not sufficient, for it
does not adequatelytake into consideration the fact that the psychiatrist has competing interests
in providing treatment to the patient, protecting .his other patients and the staff of the facility
and attempting to secure patient's earliest release from the facility." Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 646 (emphasis in original).
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A. The Professional-Judgment Standard
While the Indiana standard of judicial review articulated for refusal-of-treatment
cases purports not to rely solely on the treating psychiatrist's professional judgment,
in reality, it only takes into account the beliefs of the treating psychiatrist.3 9 Derived
from the professional-judgment standard, Indiana's standard only attempts to
determine that there was a current medical assessment resulting in an "honest belief'
of the treating psychiatrist that the medication would be of a substantial benefit to the
patient and that the probable benefits outweigh the risk of harm." Like the U.S.
Supreme Court in Youngberg,"' the Supreme Court of Indiana embraces the idea that
judges and juries are not qualified to decide such matters. This type of deference to
the treating psychiatrist's opinion, however, loses sight of the fact that a psychiatrist
is not an expert on patients' legal rights and minimizes the role of courts in reviewing
decisions to medicate patients forcibly.
When the professional-judgment standard is scrutinized, it becomes apparent that
it does not afford any protection to individuals wishing to refuse medication.42 The
professional-judgment standard defers the treatment decisions to professionals-who,
admittedly, know more about treating psychotic patients on a day-to-daybasis.43 And
it is almost a foregone conclusion in the psychiatric profession that when a
psychiatrist exercises professional judgment in treating psychosis, the result will be
treatment with antipsychotic medication." Adherence to such a narrow standard of
professional judgment, therefore, effectively cancels any constitutional protection of
a patient's fundamental right to refuse medication.45 The view that a physician-patient
relationship should be governed only by medical interests, while disregarding legal
interests, eliminates an individual's constitutional rights and is legallyproblematic no
matter if a patient is voluntary or involuntary.'
39. See id. at 647 (articulating a standard for judicial review in refusal-of-treatment cases
and requiring the psychiatrist responsible for treatment to be present at the hearing).
40. Id. The "honest belief' requirement attempts to limit the effect of conflicting interests
of the treating physician in the determination to medicate forcibly, but it still does not give the
mental patient's own treatment decisions any weight and does not account for the patient's
legal rights. See id.
41. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307,322-23 (1982) (stating why the standard ofreview
in refusal-of-treatment cases should rely on the "professional judgment" of the treating
psychiatrist).
42. Brooks, supra note 17, at 18 (criticizing complete reliance by the federal courts on the
psychiatrist's judgment).
43. See Brooks, supra note 17, at 18-19.
44. Jeannette Brian, The Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drug Treatment and the Supreme
Court: Washington v. Harper, 40 BuFF. L. REv. 251,273 (1992) (examining the effects of the
Supreme Court's extension of the professional-judgment standard articulated in Youngbergto
right-to-refuse cases in Harper, and stating that extending such deference effectively nullified
any right of the patient to refuse treatment).
45. Brooks, supra note 17, at 18-19 (finding that a professional-judgment standard in
forced-medication cases is "little more than a medical malpractice standard," which does not
adequately protect a patient's constitutional rights).
46. See Brian, supra note 44, at 274 (finding that the deference standard rests on an
assumption that the liberty interest in refusal-of-treatment cases is a purely medical one, and
[Vol. 76:4
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The Supreme Court of Indiana did recognize one of the more grievous problems
with the professional-judgment standard: the conflicting interests of the psychiatrist
in providing treatment for the patient.47 The treating psychiatrist may be swayed
towards treating the patient with antipsychotic medications by concerns that do not'
involve the patient's best interes 48 These conflicting interests may be concerns of
maintaining institutional control or budgetary concerns of reducing hospital patients
and staff. 9 When taking these conflicts of interest into account, it is of particular
concern that patients may suffer when decisions are solely left up to those providing
the treatment "since antipsychotic drugs, even if not the best treatment, are the least
costly to administer."
The standard of review used in Indiana, while purporting not to rely solely on the
professional judgment of the treating psychiatrist, is admittedly derived from the
professional-judgment standard.5 The Supreme Court of Indiana seems to recognize
that a determination to medicate forcibly, relying solely on the professional judgment
of the treating psychiatrist, provides no protection for the patient's constitutional
rights. In an attempt to rectify this flaw in the professional-judgment standard, the
court attempted to articulate a standard that determines "which of the interests
reflected by the psychiatrist is the foundation for his decision to treat the patient with
anti-psychotic drugs. 52
The Indiana Supreme Court apparently intended to eliminate any consideration of
conflicting institutional interests of the treating psychiatrist and focus, instead, solely
on the psychiatrist's professional judgment in furtherance of the patient's best
interest. Requiring an "honest belief of the psychiatrist" that medication is needed to
treat the patient's condition and not to control the behavior of the patient53 seems
honorable. In reality, however, the standard does not take account of a patient's legal
rights or treatment wishes and is nothing more than a comtilete acceptance of the
psychiatrist's professional judgment with an obligatory, but ultimately uninfluential,
nod to the patient's right to refuse treatment.
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that in cases of forcible treatment of
involuntarily committed mental patients "state law may provide greater substantive
and procedural rights than federal law."' Indiana should follow the lead of other
states and adopt a standard of review in forced-treatment cases that adequately
that this discounts the individual interests at stake).
47. See In re Mental Commitment of M.P., 510 N.E.2d 645,647 (Ind. 1987).
48. Chris R. Hogle, Note, Woodland v. Angus: The Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs
and Safeguards Appropriate for Its Protection, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1169, 1202 (stating
"[a]dvocates of the professional judgment standard ignore the imprecise nature of psychiatry
and the conflicts that would emerge if hospital staffs were accorded weighty discretion").
49. Id. (evaluating the competing interests that a treating psychiatrist will be faced with
when considering whether to recognize a patient's constitutional right to refuse treatment).
50. Id. at 1203.
51. See In re Mental Commitment ofM.P., 510 N.E.2d at 647.
52. Id.
53. Id. (stating what the state must demonstrate to override a patient's right to refuse
medication).
54. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291,299-300 (1982), cited in Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp. &
Med. Ctr., 243 Cal. Rptr. 241,252 (Ct. App. 1987).
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protects the fundamental rights of involuntarily committed mental patients. As it
exists, the standard merely restates the professional-judgment standard with a nod to
the patient's constitutional rights, while refusing to give those rights any effect in the
final treatment determination.
Indiana's current standard of judicial review in forced-medication cases leads to
inadequate protection of a patient's fundamental rights, as well as deficient
recognition of legitimate overriding interests of the state. Indiana must address both
of these flaws and adopt an adequate standard of review.
B. The Need for a Competency Hearing Before Relying on the Professional
Judgment of the Physician
There are two legitimate interests that "may override a patient's right to refuse
treatment."55 These interests should be correctly evaluated to form a workable
standard of review in refusal-of-treatment cases. One interest, which will be
discussed in Part III, is the protection of the patient and others from harm.' The
second compelling interest is the exercise of the state's parens patriae power 7 to care
for its citizens that have been adjudged not to have the ability to care for themselves.58
"The law recognizes the right of an individual to make decisions about her life out
of respect for the dignity and autonomy of the individual, that interest is no less
significant when the individual is mentally... ill." '59 The right to be free from bodily
intrusions is so fundamental that, when there is a decision about whether to comply
with medical treatment, it is the individual who must make that decision in order to
protect their right to privacy.' It is well settled that it is a constitutional invasion to
treat medically a competent person without consent, unless there is an emergency
present." Logically, this principle is true of mental patients as well.62 And, while in
55. Opinion of the Justices, 465 A.2d 484, 489 (N.H. 1987).
56. Id.; see also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,426 (1979); Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d
337, 343 (N.Y. 1986).
57. According to one author:
The doctrine is used as the basis for state laws that protect the custody, care and
education of children; the regulation of child labor; and the prosecution and
detention ofjuvenile delinquents. Each instance involves a situation in which the
community has recognized that, but for the state protecting these individuals'
interests, their future well-being would be jeopardized. Society also has placed
voluntary commitment of individuals and appointment of a guardian under the
guise of the parens patriae authority.
Mary C. McCarron, Comment, The Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs: Safeguarding the
Mentally Incompetent Patient's Right to Procedural Due Process, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 477, 490
(1990) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
58. Opinion ofthe Justices, 465 A.2d at 489; see also Mills, 457 U.S. at 296-97; Rivers,
495 N.E.2d at 343.
59. In re Mental Health of K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747, 752 (Okla. 1980).
60. Rivers, 495 N.E.2d at 341 (citing Erickson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d 27,28 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1962)).
61. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't ofHealth, 497 U.S. 261,278 (1990) ("The principle
that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted
medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions."); see also White, supra note 10,
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the past the decision of commitment may have been synonymous with a patient's
incompetency, it is almost unanimously accepted now by both medical and legal
professionals that there is no significant relationship between the need for
commitment of a mentally ill patient and the patient's ability to make treatment
decisions."'
Because involuntary commitment and a patient's mental illness do not make a
patient incompetent," the question becomes whether the medical or legal community
is best situated to determine a patient's competency.65 Courts have traditionallybeen
a proper forum for resolving issues of competency in a variety of different contexts,
and should therefore be readily equipped to determine the competency of mental
patients to make treatment decisions.' Another factor decreasing the importance of
a professional medical determination of incompetency is the fact that simply because
the patient has made an incorrect medical determination does not mean that the
patient is incapable of making a treatment decision that is in their best interest.67 A
treating physician would most likely adjudge a patient's competency based solely on
whether that patient's decision was right or wrong medically.
A legal determination of a patient's competency bears upon the state's ability to
invoke its parens patriae power to medicate patients forcibly." The parens patriae
at 10 (discussing the disparity between physical and mental illness in Louisiana's recognition
of the right to refuse medical treatment); supra note 1 and accompanying text.
62. White, supra note 10, at 10.
63. Rivers, 495 N.E.2d at 342 (exploringthe relationship between involuntary commitment
and a finding of incompetency); see also Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 271 Cal. Rptr.
199, 206 (Ct. App. 1987); Opinion of the Justices, 465 A.2d at 490; In re Conticchio, 696
N.Y.S.2d 769, 773 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999); see also Paul A. Nidich & Jacqueline Collins,
Involuntary Administration of Psychotropic Medication: A Federal Court Update, HEALTH
LAW., May 1999, at 12 (citing Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210,222-23 (1990) (discussing
a Tenth Circuit panel's determination that under the balance formulated by the Court in
Washington, a finding of incompetency of the mentally ill patient was needed for forced
treatment)).
64. Rivers, 495 N.E.2d at 342.
65. One court considered the following factors in determining whether a patient had the
capacity to make treatment decisions:
(1) the person's knowledge that he has a choice to make; (2) the patient's ability
to understand the available options, their advantages and disadvantages; (3) the
patient's cognitive capacity to consider the relevant factors; (4) the absence of any
interfering pathologic perception or belief, such as a delusion concerning the
decision; (5) the absence of any interfering emotional state, such as severe manic
depression, euphoria or emotional disability; (6) the absence of any interfering
pathologic motivational pressure; (7) the absence of any interfering pathologic
relationship, such as the conviction of helpless dependency on another person;
[and] (8) an awareness of how others view the decision, the general social attitude
toward the choices and an understanding of his reason for deviating from that
attitude if he does.
Id. at 344 n.7.
66. Mintz, supra note 2, at 904-05 (considering the inherent legal questions in resolving
a question of competency).
67. Id. at 905.
68. In re Conticchio, 696 N.Y.S.2d at 773 (determining when the state's parens patriae
2001]
INDIANA LAWJOURNAL
doctrine conflicts with the patient's liberty interest in refusing treatment by allowing
the state to administer treatment without consent.69 The prerequisite to the use of such
power by the state, however, is a judicial determination that a patient lacks the
capacity to make treatment decisions.7" Once the state has obtained a judicial finding
of the patient's incompetency, it can provide treatment over the patient's objections
by relying on the state's parens patriae power to act its citizens' best interest.7 There
are very few states where the courts have failed to recognize the complete rights of
a competent mental patient to refuse treatment.72
The Indiana standard, however, does not provide for a judicial hearing on a
patient's competency.' Although the involuntarily committed mental patient has a
statutory right to have a proposed treatment plan judicially reviewed, the standard of
review at this hearing does not take into account the possibility that the mental patient
may be capable of making an informed treatment decision.74 Indiana does, however,
statutorily require an adjudication of incompetency before medicine can be forcibly
administered to a voluntary mental patient.75 The difference in these statutes is
suspect because an involuntarily committed mental patient is not necessarily less
competent to make treatment decisions than a voluntarily committed mentalpatient.76
Absent a legal finding of incompetency upon the patient's commitment to the
institution, an involuntarily committed mental patient should not be presumed to be
incompetent and thus suffer deprivation of the right to refuse treatment possessed by
voluntarily admitted patients. In other words, unless there is an emergency situation,
the involuntarily committed mental patient should not lose the right to make treatment
decisions by virtue of their involuntarily committed status.'
Nevertheless, without the benefit of an incompetency hearing, the Supreme Court
of Indiana attempts to "establish[] ... a balance between the patient's liberty interest,
the State's parens patriae power to act in the patient's best interest, and the State's
duty to provide treatment."78 Thus, the standard of review in Indiana allows the courts
to consider the state's power to act in an involuntarily committed patient's best
interest before the patient has been found to be incapable of acting in their own best
interest with regard to treatment decisions. But by definition, this power of the state
to override a patient's treatment decision should not be considered before that patient
power can be used as a compelling interest of the state to override the patient's liberty interest).
69. McCarron, supra note 57, at 489-91 (discussing the origins and limits of the parens
patriae power of the state).
70. In re Conticchio, 696 N.Y.S.2d at 773.
71. See Brooks, supra note 5, at 1000-01 & n.435.
72. See Elyn R. Saks, Competency to Refuse Psychotropic Medication: Three Alternatives
to the Law's Cognitive Standard, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 689, 691 n.5 (1993) (noting that the
standard articulated by the Supreme Court of Indiana, which fails to recognize a right of
competent patients to refuse medication when relying on state statutes, is one adopted by a very
small number of states).
73. In re Mental Comnmitment of M.P., 510 N.E.2d 645, 646-48 (Ind. 1987).
74. IND. CODE § 12-27-5-2 (1998).
75. Id. § 12-27-5-1.
76. See Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 342 (N.Y. 1986).
77. See, e.g., Rogers v. Comm'r of Mental Health, 458 N.E.2d 308 (Mass. 1983).
78. In re Mental Commitment of M.P., 510 N.E.2d at 646 (emphasis in original).
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is found incompetent.7 9 A state cannot legitimately exercise its parens patriae power
to act in a patient's best interest until that patient is deemed by the judiciary to be
incapable of making autonomous treatment decisions."0 To hold otherwise is to
disregard a competent individual's right to refuse unwanted medical treatment.8' The
requirement ofajudicial determination ofapatient's incompetencyshould adequately
protect a competent, but involuntarily committed, patient's right to refuse medication,
while allowing the state to exercise its parens patriae power when needed to override
an incompetent patient's decision. 2
It is apparent that there should be ajudicial determination of incompetency before
the state can rely on its parens patriae power to override a patient's treatment decision
in a nonemergency situation. It is also clear, however, that the state may have a
compelling interest in forcing medication upon a mental patient in an emergency
situation. This Note now turns to evaluate the Indiana standard's failure to recognize
the state's compelling interest of preventing danger to the patient or others.
C. Providing for Emergency Situations
Although the standard of judicial review in Indiana does not adequately protect a
competent, involuntarily committed mental patient's right to refuse medication, the
Supreme Court of Indiana was obviously concerned with the rights ofmental patients
when formulating its quasi professional-judgment standard.' This concern led the
court to reject the justification of preventing danger as an overriding state interest."
But this justification is completely warranted as a compelling state interest. In order
to create a workable standard of review that adequately considers the rights of the
patient as well as those of the state, the professional-judgement standard must be
abandoned in order to protect the patient, and strict scrutiny should be applied to all
situations of forcible medication. Strict scrutiny would allow the state to override a
patient's fundamental right of refusal in situations where the state has a compelling
need (such as reliance on its parens patriae power after a judicial finding of
incompetency) and forced medication is the least restrictive means of meeting that
need. 5 The court's concern over a patient's liberty interest in this context is
unwarranted if a least-restrictive-means analysis is used.
The only interest that should override a patient's decision to refuse treatment, when
there has been no judicial finding of incompetency, is the need to medicate an
involuntarily committed mental patient in an emergency situation. 6 If the patient
79. "[P]arenspatriae does not allow the state to order treatment for a patient who is able
to make treatment decisions for himself or herself, unless that person has been determined
legally incompetent, no matter how foolish or irrational the behavior may be." McCarron,
supra note 57, at 491 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
80. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
8 1. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
82. See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 5, at 1007-08.
83. In re Mental Commitment ofMP., 510 N.E.2d at 647.
84. Id.
85. See Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 342-44 (N.Y. 1986).
86. See Hogle, supra note 48, at 1179-80 (stating that most courts are more inclined to
leave discretion to medical professionals in emergency situations).
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presents a danger to herself or others or engages in destructive behavior in the
institution, the state may administer antipsychotic medication over the patient's
objections.87 "In situations where the patient 'poses an imminent threat of harm to
himself or others,' and [where] there is no less intrusive alternative [to the forcible
medication of the patient] .... the State may [legitimately] invoke its police...
power[]" to prevent possible harm.88
It is important to note that even if the initial commitment of the patient was based
on the exercise of the state's police power in an emergency situation, that
commitment decision does not justify forcible medication of the patient.89 To override
a patient's right to refuse medication, the emergency must be a legitimate one that has
arisen within the institution.' Forced medication has been deemed acceptable in such
situations only when the need to eliminate the danger has been found to outweigh the
possible harm to the medicated patient and all other reasonable alternatives havebeen
ruled out.9'
Since "forced drugging abridges a patient's fundamental right to bodily autonomy,
due process [should] require[] [that forced medication] be the least restrictive means
of satisfying the state interest in question."'92 While an emergency situation may
justify the invocation of the state's police power to medicate an involuntarily
committed mental patient forcibly, this justification would last only as long as the
emergency exists.93 Without a least-restrictive-means consideration, the patient's
fundamental right to refuse medication may be compromised by allowing treatment
to be administered or continued when no real emergency exists.94 In order to protect
the patient's right to refuse medication in situations where the state's police power
may override the patient's liberty interest, it is important that the interest deemed
compelling is immediate and the justification for medication last only as long as the
emergency does.95
87. Rivers, 495 N.E.2d at 343 (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,426 (1979), Davis
v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915,934-35 (N.D. Ohio 1980), Colorado v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961,
971 (Colo. 1985), Gundy v. Pauley, 619 S.W.2d 730, 731 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981), and In re
Mental Health of K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747,751 (Okla. 1980)).
88. In re Guardianship of Linda, 519 N.E.2d 1296, 1299 (Mass. 1988) (citation omitted).
89. See Hogle, supra note 48, at 1179.
90. See id.
91. See Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 656 (1st Cir. 1980).
92. Brooks, supra note 5, at 1008 (citing Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992)
(discussing when a state's overriding interests of controlling hospital emergencies and treating
incompetent patients may justify forcing medication)).
93. See Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 343 (N.Y. 1986).
94. McCarron, supra note 57, at 492.
95. Litwiller, supra note 18, at 81 (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)
(suggesting a test for the emergency medication situation similar to the narrowly tailored direct
incitement test in Supreme Court First Amendment jurisprudence)).
In Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Court held that a speaker could be prosecuted for
incitement only where his or her speech was (I) directed at producing imminent
lawless conduct, and (2) likely to result in such conduct. Similarly, institutions
should be permitted to forcibly medicate only where the patient's conduct is (1)
visibly antecedent to imminent violent or lawless conduct, and (2) likely to result
in such conduct. Further, when an emergency situation is claimed to be the
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The Supreme Court of Indiana, however, rejected the standard of danger to self or
others as a state interest that could override the patient's liberty interest in refusing
medication. In In reMental Commitment ofM.P.,' the court found that "the fact that
there is a possibilitythe patient may harmhimself or anotherperson is not a sufficient
justification for permitting forced medication with anti-psychotic drugs." Because
of risks inherent in antipsychotic medication, the Supreme Court of Indiana found
that "the propensity for dangerousness is not sufficient to overcome the patient's
liberty interest in being free from unreasonable intrusions into his body and mind."98
The court feared that if the "danger to self or others" standard was applied when a
patient displayed any aggressive tendencies, the treating psychiatrist would feel free
to medicate the patient with antipsychotics to control the patient's behavior and have
no regard to the inherent risks in these medications. 9
The Supreme Court of Indiana misinterprets the standard of dangerousness to the
patient or others as a continuous, unadulterated license to medicate a patient that
displays any dangerous tendencies. In order for this standard to be correctly used as
an overriding state interest, it must be coupled with the idea that no less intrusive
alternatives are available to the state in controlling the emergency situation.' °0 In In
re Mental Commitment of M.P., the Supreme Court of Indiana found that the
treatment selected should be the one which restricts the patient's liberty interest the
least.'O' Thus, the court should have recognized that this least-restrictive-means
standard would apply in situations where the state had a compelling interest in using
its police power to prevent danger within the institution as well.
When the standard of danger to self or others is used in conjunction with the
concept that there should be no less restrictive alternative means than forcing
medication upon an involuntary mental patient, the reasons offered by the Supreme
Court of Indiana against adopting the dangerousness standard0 2 disintegrate.
Applying the least-restrictive-means concept in emergency situations should prevent
any possible abuses by the state. The Supreme Court of Indiana fears that under the
standard of danger to self or others, once a patient displays any aggressiveness, the
justification for forced administration of antipsychotics, the government should
not be permitted to administer an ongoing regimen of psychotropic drugs in order
to prevent future lawless or violent conduct. Rather, the courts should recognize
this interest as only sufficiently compelling in the context of a present, ongoing
emergency situation which justifies immediate action, but only immediate action:
that is, medication for the duration of the emergency only.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
96. In re Mental Commitment of M.P., 510 N.E.2d 645, 647 (Ind. 1987).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. (rejecting the standard of dangerous to self or others proposed by the patient's
counsel, in favor of leaning towards the more restrictive standard of professional judgment).
100. See In re Guardianship ofLinda, 519 N.E.2d 1296, 1299 (Mass. 1988); Rivers v. Katz,
495 N.E.2d 337, 343 (N.Y. 1986); Brooks, supra note 5, at 1005; Mintz, supra note 2, at 915-
16; Hogle, supra note 48, at 1179-80; McCarron, supra note 57, at 492-93.
101. In reMental Commitment ofMP., 510 N.E.2d at 647-48 ("It must be plain that there
exists no less restrictive alternative treatment and that the treatment selected is reasonable and
is the one which restricts patient's liberty interest the least degree possible.").
102. Id. at 647.
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treating psychiatrist will feel free to control the patient's behavior regardless of the
risk. 3 This possibility simply does not exist iftreatment is only allowed in situations
of imminent danger and only so long as the danger persists.'
°4
I[. AN APPROACH WHICH ADEQUATELY TAKES INTO ACCOUNT INTERESTS
OF THE PATIENT AS WELL AS THE STATE
U.S. Supreme Court cases that have considered issues similar to the forced
treatment of involuntarily committed mental patients seem to apply inconsistent
standards. 5 However, the substantive, as well as the procedural, issues in a forced-
treatment case "are intertwined with state law."'" Therefore, the standard of review
adopted by the state courts is crucial in defining both the procedures that must be
taken when a mental patient refuses treatment °7 as well as defining the substantive
rights that the mental patient has under state law. The standard adopted by the
Supreme Court of Indiana thirteen years ago03 has both procedural and substantive
problems. The standard of review for forced-medication cases adopted in New York
serves as a model that adequately protects the fundamental rights of mental patients
while providing for emergency situations.
In Rivers v. Katz,"0 9 a case decided one year before the Indiana Supreme Court
formulated its standard of review for such cases, the highest court in New York
adequately resolved both the substantive and procedural issues in forced-medication
cases. "' Substantively, theNew York Court of Appeals recognized the liberty interest
of the patient in refusing medication, by requiring that any overriding interests of the
state be compelling."' Procedurally, the decision focused on providing for ajudicial
competency hearing and the criteria that should factor into the determination at that
hearing."' In order to rectify many apparent problems with the judicial standard of
review used in Indiana, it must be recognized that the patient's liberty interest is
fundamental, and proper procedures should be in place to determine the patient's
competency. It must further be recognized that the state can satisfy the strict scrutiny
103. Id.
104. See Rivers, 495 N.E.2d at 343.
105. Compare Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (applying the professional-
judgment standard), with Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (requiring the state to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the medication was necessary and effective for
furthering a compelling state interest), and Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992) (finding
a broader right to refuse medication under the U.S. Constitution).
106. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291,299 (1982).
107. For a discussion ofthe importance ofstate courts as a source ofprotection in refusal-of-
treatment cases, see Ellen Wright Clayton, From Rogers to Rivers: The Rights of the Mentally
III to Refuse Medication, 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 7 (1987).
108. See In re Mental Commitment of M.P., 510 N.E.2d 645, 647 (Ind. 1987).
109. 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986).
110. Mintz, supra note 2, at 916. For a review of other state courts that have developed
similar standards of review in right-to-refuse cases, see Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp. & Med. Ctr.,
243 Cal. Rptr. 241,252 (Ct. App. 1987); Gundy v. Pauley, 619 S.W.2d 730, 731 (Ky. Ct. App.
1981); Opinion of the Justices, 465 A.2d 484, 489 (N.H. 1983).
111. Rivers, 495 N.E.2d at 343.
112. Mintz, supra note 2, at 916.
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standard if there is a compelling need for immediate medication, such as an
emergency situation, and forced medication is the least restrictive solution. 13
While Indiana statutorily recognizes a right to refuse medication until the proposal
has been judicially reviewed,"" the procedure followed under this rule is
constitutionally deficient for lack of guidance." 5 Simply because this statute is in
existence does not mean that mental patients' rights will be protected."6 Without a
required judicial finding ofincompetencyand the demonstration ofa compelling state
need to force medication, the hearing will simply be a formality to a judicial
deference to the treating psychiatrist.' ' The New York Court of Appeals found that
the administrative review procedures in place in New York did not sufficiently
protect the due process rights of mental patients and found that the New York
Constitution required more."8
The Rivers court standard requires, under the New York Constitution, two separate
inquiries before rendering a determination on whether the state can forcibly medicate
a patient.'"' The state first bears the burden to show by clear and convincing evidence
that the patient is incompetent to make their own treatment decisions. 0 If the state
fails to meet this burden of proof, then there is no need for further hearings, and the
state may not administer antipsychotic medication to a person capable of making
treatment decisions.'21
If a court concludes that a patient lacks the capacity to make treatment decisions,
the court must then determine whether the proposed treatment is "narrowly tailored
to give substantive effect to the patient's liberty interest."' In order to do this, the
court must consider "the patient's best interests, the benefits to be gained by the
treatment, the adverse side effects associated with the treatment and any less intrusive
alternative treatments."' 3 "The State... bear[s] the burden [of] establish[ing] by
clear and convincing evidence that the proposed treatment meets these criteria."' 24
Under this standard, the state could properly invoke its parens patriae power, as a
compelling interest, to provide care for a mental patient that is unable to care for
himself after a proper finding of incompetency."z Moreover, in an emergency
situation, the state's police power would justify forced medication, but only so long
113. See Rivers, 495 N.E.2d at 343.
114. See supra note 33.
115. See In re Mental Commitment of M.P., 500 N.E.2d 216, 227 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986)
(Sullivan, J., dissenting), superceded by 510 N.E.2d 645 (Ind. 1987).
116. See Clayton, supra note 107, at 48 n. 189 (stating that despite the presence of a statute
in Indiana recognizing a patient's right to refuse medication "the court simply stated that the
patient was not rational and then deferred to the doctor's judgment that medication would be
better for the patient" (citing In re Mental Commitment ofM.P., 500 N.E.2d at 233)).
117. See id.
118. Rivers, 495 N.E.2d at 344.
119. Mintz, supra note 2, at 908.
120. Id. (citing Rivers, 495 N.E.2d at 344).
121. Id.






as the emergency persists under the least-restrictive-means consideration.'26 Under
the criteria set out in Rivers, courts must "balance the patient's liberty interests
against the state's asserted compelling need to medicate forcibly."'" After a finding
of incompetency, the state may forcibly medicate a patient "only when the scales tip
towards a compelling need to medicate."''
The standard set forth in Rivers'29 seems to balance adequately all of the factors
that the Supreme Court of Indiana was concerned with when it formulated a standard
ofjudicial review for refusal-of-treatment cases. 30 The decision is both substantively
and procedurally sound; it adequately recognizes the fundamental liberty interests of
the patient and sets forth the proper judicial standard of review and procedures to be
taken when that fundamental right is exercised.
Like the highest state court in New York, the Supreme Court of Indiana should
recognize that the statute giving mental patients the right to refuse medication does
not adequately set out the procedures to protect that right.'' The lack of political
power of the mentally ill is apparent when one considers the lack of action taken by
the legislatures for review of treatment for the mentally ill. 32 Thus, the Supreme
Court of Indiana must take steps to protect individual rights of involuntarily
committed mental patients by formulating a standard that provides adequate due
process protection under the Indiana Constitution and adequately provides for
emergencies.
CONCLUSION
Although in Indiana the standard for judicial review of forced-treatment cases was
formulated thirteen years ago, it is still applied today by Indiana courts considering
the issue. When one considers the inherent dangers of antipsychotic drugs it is
apparent that this standard should be closely scrutinized. The standard has both
substantive and procedural problems that could easily be rectified with both a look
to other states that have formed more comprehensive standards and a move away
from the application of the professional-judgment standard.
While substantively Indiana recognizes a statutory right for the involuntary mental
patient to refuse medication, 3 1 the judicial standard of review of this statutory right
is not the strict scrutiny analysis that should be afforded to a state deprivation of an
individual's fundamental rights. In such cases it is important not merely to balance
the interests to achieve due process, but for the state to have a compelling interest in
126. Id. at 343.
127. Mintz, supra note 2, at 911 (citing Rivers, 495 N.E.2d at 344).
128. Id.
129. Rivers, 495 N.E.2d at 343-45.
130. See In re Mental Commitment of M.P., 510 N.E.2d 645, 646 (Ind. 1987) ("What must
be established is a balance between the patient's liberty interest, the State's parens patriae
power to act in the patient's best interest, and the State's duty to provide treatment." (emphasis
in original)).
131. See Clayton, supra note 107, at 51.
132. For an argument that the legislative provisions for review of mentally ill patient's
treatments are inadequate, see In re Mental Commitment of M.P., 500 N.E.2d 216, 223-28
(Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (Sullivan, J., dissenting), superceded by 510 N.E.2d 645 (Ind. 1987).
133. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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order to override the patient's fundamental interest.
While the Supreme Court of Indiana was obviously concerned about the liberty
interests of mental patients when formulating a standard of judicial review, it failed
to protect those interests adequately, by relying on an adaptation of the professional-
judgment standard." Moreover, the standard is unworkable for failure to recognize
that the state may have a compelling interest in forcing medication in emergency
situations.
135
Using strict scrutiny, Indiana courts should recognize that Indiana would have a
compelling interest in preventing danger to the patient or others within the institution.
Moreover, the courts of Indiana should not consider the state interest in using its
parens patriae power to act in the patient's best interest without a prior finding of
incompetency.
Indiana courts should recognize the political powerlessness of the mentally ill and
use due process to protect their liberty interest in being free from forced treatment.
These important individual rights are adequately protected by application of strict
judicial scrutiny in the courts of other states.'36 Involuntarily committed mentally ill
patients in Indiana should be afforded no less protection before being deprived of
their constitutional rights.
134. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
135. See supra Part II.C.
136. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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